

21 MAY 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT: Congressional Comments on the U-2 Incident
and the Collapse of the Summit Conference**

1. This memorandum is for the information of the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. Attached are two books compiled by Mr. Walter Elder at your request which contain expressions by members of Congress regarding the U-2 incident, the summit collapse and the handling of the over-all situation. The purpose of this memorandum is to highlight some of the more significant comments, particularly those made by the leadership of the Congress and the members of the committees before whom you are scheduled to appear.
3. You are aware of the position taken by the leadership of the Senate on this subject (Tabs A, C and D of Book II). You are also aware of the statements made by Representatives Cannon and Taber on the floor of the House (Tab H, Book II). Senator Jackson announced that in conjunction with its current hearings, his Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery would look into certain aspects of the U-2 incident and the summit collapse. Senator Javits, a minority member of the Subcommittee, has given Jackson his support. Senator Bridges has indicated that the Senate Armed Services Committee should obtain an explanation from CIA, the State Department and the Department of Defense. Senator Russell subsequently indicated that at an appropriate time the CIA Subcommittees of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees would request a briefing from the Agency.
4. Attached as Tab A are listings of the membership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee with brief statements concerning those members who have taken a definite position on the subject.

5. Favorable comments made by Senators Butler, Clifford Case, Dirksen, Goldwater, Keating, Scott and Smathers; Representatives Chenoweth, Gallagher, Michel, Stratton and Wilson are attached as Tab B of this memorandum.

6. Members of the Congress who were the most critical of the flight and the subsequent handling of the situation (see Tab C) included Senators Carroll, Gruening, McCarthy and Robertson; Representatives Bowles, Daddario, Evins, Kowalski, Loser, Madden, Meyer, Rogers, Sikes and Wolf. Representatives Sikes and Cohen took this opportunity to introduce measures to establish a joint committee on intelligence (Tab D).

7. An excerpt from the Congressional Record containing a copy of the letter addressed to the President by a group of Representatives posing eight questions concerning the U-2 incident and the summit meeting is attached as Tab E.

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GEORGE L. CARY, JR.
Assistant Legislative Counsel

Attachment: Tabs A to E
Books II and III


Distribution:

Orig & 1 - DCI w/Tabs A to E and Books II and III
1 - DDCI w/Tab A
1 - IG w/Tab A
1 - ER w/Tab A
1 - DD/P w/Tab A
2 - Leg. Counsel w/Tab A

OGC/LC/GLC/jmd

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HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Morgan

Carnahan

Zablocki

Burleson

* Kelly

Hays

Selden

Pilcher

O'Hara

Fountain

Fascell

Coffin

* Farbstein

Saund

* Diggs

Beckworth

McDowell

Murphy

* Meyer

Extremely critical of CIA expressing a constitutional right to know details.

*Committee members who have signed the letter to the President posing eight questions in connection with the U-2 incident (Tab E)

Gallagher

Has had a generally favorable reaction. Inserted in the Congressional Record a "bill of particulars on Soviet espionage activities".

*Bowles

Has criticized the lack of coordination by the Administration and called the operation "irresponsible and reckless".

Chipperfield

Bolton

Merrow

Judd

Has maintained a generally moderate position.

Fulton

Jackson

Church

Adair

Bentley

Curtis

Wainwright

*Committee members who have signed the letter to the President posing eight questions in connection with the U-2 incident (Tab E)

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Legislative Counsel, 221 East				28 May 69	
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Paper Number 1

SOVIET PROTESTS AND U.S. RESPONSES

The attached materials are reproduced copies of past Soviet protests and United States responses. These exchanges of diplomatic correspondence were specifically related to U-2 flights which occurred in 1956 from Germany and in 1958 from Japan. The compilation does not include the latest Soviet note which resulted from the 1 May incident.

Attention is invited to the fact that the 1956 protest refers to the "invading" aircraft as twin-engine bombers. The protest of 1958 identifies the aircraft involved as a Lockheed U-2 type.

Particular attention is invited to the 5 March 1958 Soviet note, paragraph 3. Soviet knowledge of such flights did not interfere with the Geneva Summit meeting, nor did they mention such flights either privately or in conference during the Summit meeting. There followed, in fact, a period of cordiality between the Soviets and the United States and only now have they chosen to blame the U.S. and the U-2 for the Summit collapse. This is a tactic in reverse.

SUMMARY OF SOVIET PROTEST
TO U. S. RE OVERFLIGHTS

On 10 July 1956 Soviet Ambassador Georgi N. Zaroubin presented a protest note (No. 23) to Secretary of State Dulles, charging that United States "military aircraft" (identified as a twin-engined bomber) had "grossly violated" Soviet air space on 4, 5, and 9 July by flights as deep as 200 miles inside the Soviet Union. Lincoln White, State Department Press Officer, referred Mr. Zaroubin's note to the Defense Department. The Department of State stated immediately, and the Department of Defense later confirmed, that the United States knew nothing about such flights. "No aircraft assigned to the command in Europe," Headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany, insisted, "violated Soviet or satellite territory."

On 16 July 1956 Polish Ambassador Ryszard Spasowski delivered an oral protest to Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, stating that "jets flying at high altitudes" (mentioned in the Soviet note) violated Polish air space. The Ambassador also claimed that at 6:00 p.m. on 10 July a plane had violated Polish air space.

On 19 July 1956 the State Department officially answered the Soviet protest note:

"A thorough inquiry has been conducted and it has been determined that no United States military planes based, or flying, in or adjacent to the European area at the time of the alleged overflights could possibly have strayed, as alleged, so far from their known flight plans, which carefully exclude such overflights as the Soviet note alleges. Therefore the statement of the Soviet Union is in error."

The State Department noted that the Soviet protest implied a "plot to hinder the improvement of international relations," and added: "These remarks, which are as obviously out of place as they are unwarranted, indeed of themselves have the effect of hindering the improvement of international relations."

On 21 July 1956 the Czech Foreign Ministry passed a note of protest to the American Embassy in Prague demanding that overflights be stopped.

On 23 July 1956 Marshal S. I. Rudenko, Russian Air Force Chief of Staff, stated that the Air Force has been ordered not to shoot on sight foreign planes intruding into Soviet air space (and that is why the violations mentioned in Note No. 23 were not - shot down). The Marshal also claimed that the violators were flying at "tremendous altitude." "Our planes," he emphasized, "flew alongside and signaled them to land, but the American planes disregarded the signals and continued on their courses." One American reporter suggested the planes may have been made in the United States and sold to another country. "That's your responsibility," Rudenko replied.

On 14 July 1956, Drew Pearson in his evening broadcast stated, "Here is the inside story on those mysterious airplanes that have flown deep inside Russia several times in the past two weeks. Though the Russians blame the American Air Force, I can reveal these planes are not American at all; they are privately owned, converted fighter bombers operated by anti-Communist refugee groups from secret air bases in West Germany. The Russians know that they are dropping pamphlets, agents and supplies to anti-Communist forces in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. That's one reason for the unrest in this area."

27 July 1956

1

MR. DULLES:

This is for your information.

1. 5 May Khrushchev speech to Supreme Soviet:

"We had protested to the United States in the past about certain similar acts (overflights).... The last but one aggressive act was committed by the U. S. on April 9, 1960.

2. 9 May speech at the Czech Embassy reception:

"I shall say further when Twining, then Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, arrived here we welcomed him as a guest and entertained him. He left our country by air and the next day sent a plane flying at great altitude to our country. This plane flew as far as Kiev."

3. Gromyko's press conference on 11 May:

"Question: How long has the Soviet Union known that such flights have been going on over its territory?

"Answer: It is well known and there have been reports about this in the press that the Soviet Government has made appropriate complaints to the U. S. Government concerning the violation of the Soviet State frontier by American aircraft. We have made these complaints more than once. Khrushchev dealt with only two cases in his speeches to the Supreme Soviet, particularly with the latest case which took place on 1 May, and was most blatant and gross in character."

4. Khrushchev's press conference in Paris on 18 May:

"Question: (NBC) Why since you knew about these flights did you not tell President Eisenhower about them and ask him to stop them when you visited the United States?

"Answer: When we were talking in Camp David with President Eisenhower, I almost opened my mouth to make

that statement. I was on the point of making it because the atmosphere there was so convivial with President Eisenhower telling me to call him 'my friend' in English, and using the same words with regard to myself in Russian, and then thought I, why not raise this matter with this friend of mine? But then I became apprehensive and I thought there was something fishy about this friend of mind and I didn't broach the subject and it turned out that he was right because we caught them red-handed. They say they are not thieves, it is just their thief like policy."

WE
24 May